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Abstract 
 
In this essay, the author explores how research in mathematics education is always already 
entangled with and in ontological, epistemological, and ethical considerations—that is, 
philosophical considerations—of the researcher from beginning to end. The danger in too 
much of the existing mathematics education research, however, is limited acknowledge-
ment of how philosophical considerations drive both knowledge production and knowledge 
dissemination in the field. “Practical” definitions of ontology, epistemology, and ethics are 
provided as well as descriptions of how each concept is made sense of across the para-
digms of inquiry spectrum: predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct. The author 
concludes the essay with a summative argument of where and how to begin engaging phil-
osophical considerations and a brief discussion of an emerging paradigm of inquiry. 
 
Keywords Mathematics Education Research, Paradigms of Inquiry, Philosophical Consid-
erations 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
On-tol-o-gy where? E-pis-te-mol-o-gy what? Ethics… Yay, finally, I know what ethics are … I 
think? But what do ethics have to do with those other two concepts? 
 
For over a decade, I have been teaching an introduction to the PhD degree program in mathemat-
ics education course at Georgia State University. The above statement is representative of the 
often-expressed puzzled reactions of students to three concepts that, although initially somewhat 
unfamiliar, are continuously revisited throughout the introductory course (and all of my doctoral 
courses). When I see the puzzled looks on students’ faces as we begin to explore the meanings of 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics, I often pause and share with them my own puzzlement two 
decades earlier when I was sitting in a similar course at the University of Georgia (Dr. Jeremy 
Kilpatrick was the professor). Back then, I tell the students, if I reached far into my own school-
ing experiences, I could recall the concepts from my introductory philosophy course in my initial 
undergraduate degree some twenty years earlier (Dr. James Humber was the professor). But I 
failed to recall their exact meanings, and I certainly did not understand how significant the con-
cepts would become to my future as a mathematics education researcher. I proceed then to ex-
plain to the budding mathematics education researchers that, from my perspective, considera-
tions of ontology, epistemology, and ethics—in short, philosophical considerations (Paul & Mar-
fo, 2001)—are the most important considerations to continuously revisit as they progress through 
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the degree program, and throughout their newly chosen profession as a mathematics education 
researcher. The degree that they are seeking, after all, is a Doctor of Philosophy. 
In this essay, I argue for the centrality of  philosophical considerations throughout the pro-
cess of conceiving, planning, and conducting mathematics education research. I being with a 
brief discussion of the current attacks on philosophy in general, providing a counterargument to 
those who might see the discipline philosophy as esoteric. I then provide a brief historical tracing 
of the inclusion of a philosophical dimension to mathematics education (research or otherwise). 
Next, I define the concepts ontology, epistemology, and ethics and provide descriptions of how 
each concept is made sense of across the paradigms of inquiry spectrum: predict, understand, 
emancipate, and deconstruct. Interestingly, the title of this essay is a coupling of the titles of two 
essays that I use in my introductory doctoral course: “Scholars Before Researchers: On the Cen-
trality of the Dissertation Literature Review in Research Preparation” (Boote & Beile, 2005) and 
“Preparation of Educational Researchers in Philosophical Foundations of Inquiry” (Paul & Mar-
fo, 2001). Both essays make convincing arguments that preparation of educational researchers 
needs to move away from teaching research as mere technical methods and procedures and to-
ward teaching research as philosophical endeavors of scholarly inquiry. 
It is important to note that I do not intend the discussion to provide a complete exploration of 
philosophical considerations of mathematics education (research or otherwise); philosophical 
considerations have been explored and debated for millennia. Nor do I intend the discussion to 
provide a complete survey of different theoretical and methodological possibilities for conduct-
ing mathematics education research. But rather my intention here is for the discussion to act as a 
primer of sorts to assist doctoral students in organizing and making sense of the proliferation of 
choices throughout the process of conceiving, planning, and conducting education research (cf. 
Lather, 2006). In other words, I hope that the discussion marks a reasonable starting point for 
novice researchers: an exploration and integration of one’s own beliefs about existence, 
knowledge, morality, and so on—beliefs that either knowingly or unknowingly drive choices 
made throughout the research process. In the end, I hope that the discussion convincingly shows 
new (and even old) mathematics education researchers that philosophical considerations are al-
ways already entangled with and in research from beginning to end (St. Pierre, 2011). 
 
2.  Philosophy and Mathematics Education Research 
 
Philosophy as an intellectual pursuit, it seems, is continuously under attack as the corporatization 
of higher education accelerates in these neoliberal, anti-intellectual times (Peters, 2019; Olssen & 
Peters, 2005), attacks which have included complete closures of philosophy departments (see, 
e.g., Claremont Graduate University, 2018; Seltzer, 2017; Wolff, 2010). Recently, however, one 
of the celebrated stewards of U.S. education, Dr. Howard Gardner (2018), provided an alterna-
tive to these attacks. Rather than the closure of philosophy departments, Gardner puts forth the 
compelling argument that every undergraduate student should be required to complete two phi-
losophy courses. These two courses, one at the beginning of students’ undergraduate experience 
and one at the end, would explore questions of identity, purpose, virtues and vices, and existence. 
The first course would be a general exploration of the “Big Questions of Life,” attempting to 
avoid using the word philosophy altogether. The second course would explore the discipline 
more directly through the use of classical and contemporary philosophy texts that survey endur-
ing as well as present-day issues, issues such as “just and unjust wars, human and artificial intel-
ligence, bioethics, the nature of consciousness” (para. 14). The purpose of these two courses: “to 
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equip graduates with a philosophical armamentarium they could draw from—and contribute to—
for the rest of their lives” (para. 15).  
Equipping mathematics educators (researchers or otherwise) with a philosophical armamen-
tarium that they might draw from and contribute to for the rest of their careers, as well as their 
lives, was in part the purpose I suppose in Higginson’s (1980) proposal for the inclusion of a 
philosophical dimension to mathematics education (research or otherwise). Proposed in the early 
foundational years of the discipline, Higginson suggested mathematics education be informed 
not simply by mathematics and psychology but also by sociology and philosophy. The inclusion 
of philosophy is important, he claimed, because all human “intellectual activity is based on a set 
of assumptions of a philosophical type” (p. 4). These assumptions— 
 
will vary from discipline to discipline and between individuals and groups…. They may be 
explicitly acknowledged or only tacitly so, but they will always exist. Reduced to their es-
sence these assumptions deal with concerns such as the nature of ‘knowledge’, ‘being’, 
‘good’, ‘beauty’, ‘purpose’ and ‘value’. More formally we have, respectively, the fields of 
epistemology, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, teleology and axiology. More generally we have 
the issues of truth, certainty and logical consistency. (p. 4) 
 
Throughout the past 30 years or so, several mathematics education scholars and researchers 
have explored just what the inclusion of a philosophical dimension might provide the discipline 
mathematics education. In the early 1980s, this inclusion was demonstrated through the for-
mation of the Topic Study Group on Theory in Mathematics Education in 1984 at the 5th Inter-
national Congress for Mathematical Education. In the discussions of this group, philosophical 
considerations often took center stage. The purpose of the group, as Steiner (1985) summarized, 
was “to give mathematics education a higher degree of self-reflectedness and self-assertiveness, 
to promote another way of thinking and of looking at the problems and their interrelations” (p. 
16, emphasis in original). International collaborations found in edited volumes from the 1990s, 
2000s, and 2010s have continue to illustrate the importance of including philosophical dimen-
sions. For instance, edited volumes such as the International Commission on Mathematical In-
struction study Mathematics Education as a Research Domain: A Search for Identity (Sierpinska 
& Kilpatrick, 1998) and the three editions of the International Handbook of Mathematics Educa-
tion (Bishop et al., 1996, 2003; Clements et al., 2013) contain several chapters exploring philo-
sophical dimensions. Paul Ernest, through his many books and edited volumes (see, e.g., Ernest, 
1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1998) and his founding and ongoing editorship of the Philosophy of Math-
ematics Education Journal (Ernest, n.d.), approaching its 30-year anniversary, is the most noted 
scholar who continues to bring philosophical dimensions to the fore in mathematics education. 
Ernest (1991), in his foundational and often-cited book The Philosophy of Mathematics Edu-
cation, surveys the philosophical dimensions of both mathematics and mathematics education. 
Drawing on Higginson’s (1980) argument that all human intellectual activity rests on assump-
tions of a philosophical type, Ernest questions some of the ontological, epistemological, and eth-
ical problems and issues (among others) surrounding the philosophy of mathematics, the nature 
of learning, the aims of education, the nature of teaching, and the philosophy of mathematics ed-
ucation. Recently, Ernest (2016b) contended that applying philosophical methods to 
 
mathematics education matters because it gives people new ‘glasses’ through which to see 
the world. It enables people to see beyond official stories about the society, mathematics, and 
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education. It provides thinking tools for questioning the status quo, for seeing ‘what is’ is not 
‘what has to be’; enabling us to imagine alternatives [sic] possibilities. (p. 2) 
 
In the remainder of this essay, I aim to assist others in imagining alternative possibilities by 
exploring the sense making of ontology, epistemological, and ethics within the context of social 
science research in general and mathematics education research in particular. Throughout the 
essay, I provide multiple references for further explorations. I begin, however, by connecting 
philosophical considerations to paradigms of inquiry (i.e., theoretical and methodological con-
siderations)—more familiar terrain for mathematics education researchers. 
   
3.  Paradigms of Inquiry and Philosophical Considerations 
 
I take this slight detour into paradigms of inquiry to bring in sharp relief that questions of being, 
knowledge, goodness, among others, are always already entangled throughout the research pro-
cess. Details of various paradigms of inquiry available to mathematics education researchers 
through the overlapping and simultaneously operating historical moments of mathematics educa-
tion research—the process–product moment (1970s–), the interpretivist–constructivist moment 
(1980s–), the social-turn moment (mid-1980s–), and the sociopolitical-turn moment (2000s–)—
are provided elsewhere. (See Stinson and Bullock [2012, 2015] for details of each moment and 
identified exemplars of mathematics education research studies within each moment.) Without 
recounting the details, Table 1 (Stinson & Walshaw, 2017, p. 133) maps these ongoing historical 
moments (i.e., no end dates) to different paradigms of inquiry—predict, understand, emancipate, 
and deconstruct—which, in turn, support different theoretical frameworks and methodological 
approaches. Paradigms of inquiry highlight for researchers “what it is they are about, and what 
falls within and outside the limits of legitimate inquiry”; they are defined by responses to three 
fundamental and interrelated questions: the ontological question, the epistemological question, 
and the methodological question (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). The three questions are interre-
lated “because the answer given to any one question, taken in any order, constrains [more times 
than not] how the others may be answered” (p. 108). 
Although Table 1 provides a sharp visual for organizing and structuring the interrelatedness 
of paradigms and moments, given the often objectionable responses I have received over the 
years in presenting Table 1 (either in publications or at conferences), there are some important 
caveats to be noted. Maybe the unavoidable sharp edges of categories have motivated these re-
sponses? Nevertheless, caveats that were noted when I initially presented an earlier version of 
the table (see Stinson & Bullock, 2015) require being repeated and extended here. First, similar 
to how Lather and St. Pierre (Lather, 2006) categorized the paradigms of inquiry (predict, under-
stand, emancipate, and deconstruct), the moments of mathematics education research categorized 
(the process–product moment, the interpretivist–constructivist moment, the social-turn moment, 
and the sociopolitical-turn moment) are understood as overlapping and simultaneously operating 
(Stinson & Bullock, 2012). It is also important to note that neither Lather and St. Pierre nor I 
claim that movement among the paradigms occurs in some linear fashion, arriving at a “best” or 
“better” place as a researcher moves across some continuum. But rather both the paradigms and 
moments are arranged more or less in historical chronological order. Second, I unequivocally 
acknowledge that categories are always limiting and dangerous. Nonetheless, the categories used 
to label both the paradigms and the moments provide somewhat of a generally accepted and di-
rect way to mark the stark differences among the paradigms and moments. Third, the placement 
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of theoretical and methodological perspectives under a specific inquiry paradigm (or paradigms) 
is also limiting and dangerous; in that, for example, critical research is not only about emancipa-
tion nor is poststructural research only about deconstruction. The table therefore list several theo-
retical and methodological traditions under each category and illustrates how some traditions 
crossover multiple paradigms. Fourth, although Table 1 does not provide an exhausted list of 
theoretical and methodological possibilities, it certainly provides an expansive list as mathemat-
ics education researchers consider theoretical and methodological interrelatedness and philo-
sophical entanglement throughout the research process. And fifth, Table 1 is not intended to pro-
vide a restrictive and definitive way of representing the complexities and messiness of the re-
search process but rather intended to provide a visual for making sense of the proliferation of 
theoretical and methodological choices that a novice (and seasoned) mathematics education re-
searcher must and does make. 
 
Table 1 
Mapping Moments of Mathematics Education Research to Paradigms of Inquiry 
 
 
• Process–Product Moment (1970s–)®Predict 
• Interpretivist–Constructivist Moment (1980s–)®Understand 
• Social-Turn Moment (mid 1980s–)®Understand (albeit, contextualized understanding) or Emancipate (or os-
cillate between the two) 
• Sociopolitical-Turn Moment (2000s–)®Emancipate or Deconstruct (or oscillate between the two) 
 
Paradigms of Inquiry 
Predict Understand Emancipate  Deconstruct 
 
*Positivist 
Experimental 
Quasi-experimental 
Mixed methods> 
 
 
*Interpretivist 
Social constructivist 
Radical constructivist 
Sociocultural> 
Phenomenological 
Ethnographic 
Symbolic Interaction 
 
 
*Critical 
<<Feminist> 
Critical Race Theory> 
Latino/a Critical Race Theory> 
Critical Theories of Race> 
<Participatory Action Research 
Critical Ethnography 
 
   
   
   
 B
RE
AK
 
 
*Poststructural/ 
Postmodern 
Postcritical 
Postcolonial 
Posthumanist 
Post-Freudian 
<Discourse Analysis 
 
Note. *Indicates the term most commonly used; < or > indicates cross-paradigm movement. The BREAK in the 
original Lather and St. Pierre table indicated a shift from the Enlightenment humanist paradigms on the left to the 
post-Enlightenment, posthumanist paradigm on the right. Here it indicates a hybrid, in-between space where the 
researcher might adopt a critical postmodern theoretical tradition (see Stinson & Bullock, 2012, 2015). 
 
Paradigms of inquiry adapted from table by P. A. Lather and B. St. Pierre, 2005, found in “Paradigm Proliferation as 
a Good Thing to Think With: Teaching Research in Education as a Wild Profusion,” by P. A. Lather, 2006, Interna-
tional Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 19(1), p. 37. 
 
 
Note: Reprinted from “Exploring Different Theoretical Frontiers for Different (and Uncertain) Possibilities in Math-
ematics Education Research,” by D. W. Stinson and M. A. Walshaw, 2017. In J. Cai (Ed.), Compendium for Re-
search in Mathematics Education, p. 133. Copyright 2017 by the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. 
 
In the end, Table 1 is intended to show that within each of the moments, within each of the 
paradigms, and within each of the theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches ques-
tions of ontology, epistemology, and, I add, ethics (among others) are always already entangled 
and are either knowingly or unknowingly engaged. Given that theoretical frameworks and meth-
odological approaches are embedded in paradigms of inquiry, and paradigms of inquiry are em-
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bedded in assumptions of a philosophical type (cf. Crotty, 1998), no researcher (or research 
team) working in any moment, any paradigm, or any framework or approach, I believe, should 
be absolved from engaging questions of a philosophical type.  
Mirroring others (e.g., Crotty, 1998; Lather, 2006; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln, Lyntham, 
& Guba, 2011), I use Table 1 to structure the remainder of the discussion. In that, the concepts 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics are presented in the contexts of the different paradigms of 
inquiry: predict, understand, emancipate, deconstruct. How each of these concepts are made 
sense of across the paradigm spectrum illustrates not only the divergences in approaches to re-
search (mathematics education or otherwise) but also the interrelatedness of the concepts. 
But before I discuss ontology, epistemology, and ethics, two caveats are necessary. First, alt-
hough the concepts are presented as discrete, they are in fact continuous (i.e., interrelated); in 
that, to speak about one always includes speaking implicitly or explicitly about the other two (see 
Cannon, 2019, for a brief discussion of Karen Barad’s ethico-onto-epistem-ology in mathematics 
education research). Philosophical engagement in general is complex and multilayered; it re-
quires filigree ways of thinking with multiple and overlapping trajectories; ways of thinking that 
embrace uncertainty and openness rather than the fictions of certainty and closure. Second, the 
discussion is intended to be neither an argument between quantitative science versus qualitative 
science (see Ercikan & Roth, 2006) nor an argument between continental philosophy versus ana-
lytic philosophy (see Cooper, 1994). But rather, an informative discussion in which no matter 
where a person positions herself or himself (or themself) on the paradigm spectrum she or he (or 
they) sees the importance of knowingly engaging philosophical considerations throughout the 
research process. To ease the reader into the discussion, I begin each section simply with the fa-
miliarities and practicalities of the “official” Merriam-Webster definition of the concept, moving 
to more complex ideas as the exploration of each concept ensues. 
 
3.1 Ontology 
 
Definition of ONTOLOGY 
1 : a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and relations of being • Ontology 
deals with abstract entities. 
2 : a particular theory about the nature of being or the kinds of things that have exist-
ence (Merriam-Webster, 2018) 
 
Ontology is one of those philosophical concepts that philosophers and theorists as well as re-
searchers acknowledge but most attempt to quickly move over, under, or around in efforts to 
avoid meeting it head on. Its metaphysical part is its most avoided. The concept is older than Pla-
to’s Forms (cf. Plato, trans. 1996), and can be understood as having four different yet related 
conceptions:  
 
• Ontology 1: the study of ontological commitment, that is, what we or others are commit-
ted to; 
• Ontology 2: the study of what there is; 
• Ontology 3: the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things 
there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways; and 
• Ontology 4: the study of meta-ontology, that is, saying what task it is that the discipline 
of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should 
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be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered. (Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy, para. 27, 2017a) 
 
In modern-day philosophy, Carnap (1950/1956) rejects ontology altogether; Quine (1948) 
contends that its problem “is its simplicity” (p. 21) and refers to it as a “crusty old word” (Quine, 
1951, p. 66). While Levinas (1989) claims that it is fundamental: “To take up once more the 
problem of ontology (implicitly resolved by everyone, be it only under the form of forgetful-
ness), is to establish a fundamental knowing, it seems, without which all philosophical, scientific, 
or common knowledge remains naïve” (p. 121). 
Recall, in the context of social science research in general, the ontological question is the 
first of three interrelated questions to ask with respect to which paradigm(s) of inquiry the re-
searcher might be positioned: “What is the form and nature of reality and therefore, what is there 
that can be known about it” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). Ontology in the context of mathe-
matics education (research or otherwise) is further complicated by the “realness” (or not) of two 
specific entities: mathematical objects and human beings (Ernest, 2016a). The prevailing ontolo-
gy of mathematical objects for over two millennia, Platonism, asserts that mathematical objects 
exist independent of human beings’ thought, language, and practices. Ernest (1998), however, in 
careful detail discusses and critiques this ontological stance and others in his argument for a so-
cial constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics and, in turn, of mathematics education (re-
search or otherwise) (see also Davis & Hersh, 1981/1998; Hersh, 1997; Tymoczko, 1998). The 
move toward a social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics teaching, learning, and re-
search engages ontological considerations of the nature of human beings. Here, it is not only a 
question of the nature of mathematical objects but also a question of the nature of “the ‘non-
essential essence’ of learners, teachers and persons in general presupposed by teaching, learning 
and research in mathematics” (Ernest, 2016a, p. 7). Such ontological considerations support the 
claim that the radical constructivism versus social constructivism debate (see, e.g., Lerman, 
1996, 2000; Steffe & Kieren, 1994; Steffe & Thompson, 2000) is not only epistemological but 
also ontological (Packer & Goicoechea, 2000). 
Ontological considerations, as previously noted, are understood differently in each of the 
paradigms of inquiry: predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct. For instance, ontology in 
the predict paradigm (i.e., positivists) is objective realism, a view that objects—for example, 
mathematical objects—exist independent of the knower. Reality here is “objective” and “found” 
(Lather, 2006). This objective found reality is ordered by natural laws and mechanisms; the 
“‘way things are’ is conventionally summarized in the form of time- and context-free generaliza-
tions, some of which take the form of cause–effect laws” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 109). Direct 
experience not speculation is the foundation of science, which advances “by a study of the ‘giv-
en’ (in Latin datum or, in the plural, data)” (Crotty, 1998, p. 20). 
Ontology for the interpretivists and constructivists of the understand paradigm is subjective 
relativism. The real here is “apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental construc-
tions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature…and dependent for their 
form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions” (Guba & Lin-
coln, p. 110–111). Although there are important differences between the relativism of interpre-
tivists and the relativism of constructivists, an essential similarity is that both uncritically accept 
the realness of their individual and collective interpretations and constructions (Crotty, 1998); 
and critical here is understood in the critical theoretical sense (cf. Bronner, 2011). In short, reali-
ty is subjectively yet uncritically interpreted and constructed (Lather, 2006). 
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Historical realism is the ontology of the emancipate paradigm (i.e., critical theorists). What is 
real is shaped by current and historical social, cultural, political, economic, racial, ethnic, gender, 
and so forth discourses (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Discourses here are to be understood not only 
as language but also as the complex web of institutions, structures, signs, and practices that order 
and sustain socio-historical, -cultural, and -political constructed forms of social existence (Leis-
tyna, Woodrum, & Sherblom, 1996). These discourses are reified and sustained with and in heg-
emonic structures that “are now (inappropriately) taken as ‘real,’ that is, natural and immutable” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). Hegemony constructs people as objects—those who are acted 
upon, rather than Subjects, those who act—who become so entrenched in their own oppressive 
condition that they do not realize their own subjugation or their complicity in the perpetuation of 
unjust social and economic systems (Freire, 1970/2000). Reality in brief is constituted with and 
in hegemonic systems of socio-historical, -cultural, and -political discourses of power (Lather, 
2006). 
Reality for the poststructuralists and postmodernists of the deconstruct paradigm is unknow-
able: that which exist is always already contingent, multiple, fragmented, and becoming. There is 
an incredulity toward universal metanarratives of being (cf. Lyotard, 1979/1984). The one uni-
versal mind of the rational human subject is replaced here with multiple minds, multiple subjects, 
and multiple knowledges that reflect different socio-historical, -cultural, and -political locations 
(Seidman, 1994). The ontology of the deconstruct paradigm therefore is an anti-universal realism 
that attempts “to pass beyond man [human] and humanism” (Derrida, 1978, p. 292). Such an on-
tology, however, is more than simply a critique of realism; in that, “it questions representation 
and the underlying belief of a reality that is independent of representation yet capturable by it” 
(Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 14). Or said in another way, “the real is not only what can be repro-
duced, but that which is already reproduced” (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 146).  
 
3.2 Epistemology 
 
Definition of EPISTEMOLOGY 
: the study or a theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference 
to its limits and validity (Merriam-Webster, 2018) 
 
Epistemology, unlike ontology, is often embraced by philosophers, theorists, and researchers 
as a productive site for research. The absence per se of a metaphysical component makes engag-
ing epistemological considerations more consistent with the Enlightenment—the Age of Reason 
(cf. Foucault, 1978/2003b). The growth of epistemological perspectives has been exponential; 
for every discipline of human pursuit there seems to be a proliferation of epistemologies. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005) extends the definition of epistemology to include 
both the study of knowledge and the study of justified beliefs. As such, there are two sets of 
questions that might be asked: 
 
Questions about Knowledge— 
• What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? 
• What are its sources? 
• What is its structure, and what are its limits? 
Questions about Justified Beliefs— 
• How are we to understand the concept of justification?  
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• What makes justified beliefs justified? 
• Is justification internal or external to a person’s own mind? (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2015, para. 1) 
 
Recall, the epistemological question is the second of three interrelated questions to ask with 
respect to researcher position across the paradigm spectrum: “What is the nature of the relation-
ship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 
p. 108). In the context of social science research in general, Crotty (1998) defines epistemology 
as “the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the method-
ology” (p. 3). Such a definition makes explicitly engaging epistemological considerations 
throughout the research process inescapable. Where a researcher might be able to engage ontolo-
gy implicitly (or not at all), such a strategy is not possible here. In the context of mathematics 
education, researchers and educators often hold different and at times conflicting epistemological 
stances (e.g., recall the radical constructivists vs. social constructivists debate previously noted). 
These conflicts often “lie along issues such as the subjective–objective character of knowledge, 
the role in cognition of the social and cultural context, and the relationship between language and 
knowledge” (Sierpinska & Lerman, 1996, p. 829). These conflicts stretch across the paradigm 
spectrum, given that epistemology too is understood differently in each paradigm of inquiry. 
Objectivism, for instance, is the epistemology for the positivists of the predict paradigm. 
Here, the researcher and the researched “object” are independent entities, and the researcher is 
capable of researching the object without influencing it or being influenced by it (Guba & Lin-
coln, 1994). Ideologies and biases of the researcher do not influence research findings as long as 
the prescriptive procedures of positivist science are rigorously followed (Guba & Lincoln). Ob-
jective knowledge is not only ideologically free but also universal; replicated findings are not 
only possible but also “true.” 
The interpretivist and constructivist of the understand paradigm maintain a subjectivist epis-
temology. The researcher and the researched object here are forever linked through interactions; 
therefore, the findings are essentially produced in and through the research process (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). The world and objects do not exist independent of interpretations and construc-
tions of the world and objects. In other words, consciousness—interpretivist and constructivist—
“is always consciousness of something” (Crotty, 1998, p. 44, emphasis in original). Interpre-
tivists understand knowledge as “culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the 
social life-world” (p. 67). Constructivists, on the other hand, understand knowledge as “contin-
gent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interactions between human beings 
and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context” (p. 42). Dif-
ferent people and groups interpret and construct meanings differently; in that, both interpreta-
tions and constructions are socially and experientially based and local and specific in nature. 
Similarly, critical theorists of the emancipate paradigm also acknowledge that different peo-
ple and groups interpret and construct meanings differently. These interpretations and construc-
tions, however, are embedded in a critical subjectivist epistemology that is forever intertwined 
with and in hegemonic discourses of socio-historical, -cultural, and -political power (cf. Kinche-
loe & McLaren, 1994; Kincheloe, McLaren, & Steinberg, 2011). Knowledge therefore is neither 
ideologically free nor universal but rather made in and through discourses of domination and op-
pression (Freire, 1970/2000). 
The epistemological stance in the deconstruct paradigm is one in which the “nature” of 
knowledge found in humanism is replaced with the “discursive formation” of knowledge made 
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in and through discursive events (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 38). Knowledge as discursive for-
mation is not concerned with uncovering the “truth” of statements and discourses that comprise 
discursive events per se but rather with the “historical conditions, assumptions, and power rela-
tions that allow certain statements, and by extension, certain discourses to appear” (St. Pierre, 
2000, p. 496). The field of discursive events, however, is a grouping that is always finite and lim-
ited at any moment to the linguistic sequences that have been formulated; these sequences may 
be innumerable, they may exceed the capacities of recording, memory, or reading; nevertheless, 
they form a finite grouping (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 27). In effect, knowledge as discursive for-
mation no longer maintains its privileged status as an objective reality, but rather knowledge it-
self becomes subjected to and limited by the very socio-historical, -cultural, and -political condi-
tions, assumptions, and power relations against which natural knowledge within the humanist 
tradition claimed immunity (Stinson, 2016). 
 
3.3 Ethics 
 
Definition of ETHIC 
1 ethics plural in form but singular or plural in construction: the discipline dealing 
with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation  
2 a: a set of moral principles: a theory or system of moral values • the present-day ma-
terialistic ethic • an old-fashioned work ethic—often used in plural but singular or 
plural in construction • an elaborate ethics • Christian ethics 
b: ethics plural in form but singular or plural in construction: the principles of con-
duct governing an individual or a group • professional ethics 
c: a guiding philosophy  
d: a consciousness of moral importance • forge a conservation ethic 
3 ethics plural: a set of moral issues or aspects (such as rightness) • debated the ethics 
of human cloning (Merriam-Webster, 2018) 
 
Ethics is often regarded as the most accessible branch of philosophy given that “many of its 
presuppositions are self-evident or trivial truths: All human actions, for example, serve some end 
or purpose; whether they are right or wrong depends on an actor’s overall aims” (Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy, 2017b, para. 4). Dewey and Tufts (1932/1985) describe ethics simply as 
“a systematic account of our judgments about conduct, in so far as these estimate it from the 
standpoint of right or wrong, good or bad” (p. 9). Similar to epistemology, there has been a pro-
liferation of “codes of ethics” with nearly ever discipline of human pursuit developing its own. A 
commonality of these multiple codes with respect to research is that they often provide guide-
lines on four overlapping areas of procedural concern: informed consent, deception, privacy and 
confidentiality, and accuracy (Christians, 2011; see also Sowder, 1998). 
In the context of social science research in general, Guillemin and Gillam (2004) identify two 
dimensions of ethical concern: “procedural ethics and ‘ethics in practice’” (p. 262). They define 
procedural ethics as those ethical concerns most often addressed by research ethics committees 
(e.g., Institutional Review Boards). They define ethics in practice as the ongoing day-to-day eth-
ical concerns that arise throughout the research process (e.g., the disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation from a research participant). Although Guillemin and Gillam perceive continuity between 
the two dimensions, they frame ethics in practice within reflexivity. Reflexivity requires thinking 
about the researcher’s positionality and how the process of conducting research affects the study 
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and the human relationships developed throughout the study (Glesne, 1999). In being reflexive, 
the researcher becomes alert not only to concerns related to knowledge creation (i.e., epistemol-
ogy) but also to the ethical concerns of research (Guillemin & Gillam). Here, the researcher 
adopts “a continuous process of critical scrutiny and interpretation, not just in relation to the re-
search methods and the data but also to the researcher, participants, and the research context” (p. 
275). 
Similarly, in the context of mathematics education research, Ernest (2012; see also Adler & 
Lerman, 2003) makes a four-point argument for ethics as the “first philosophy” of mathematics 
education research. First, ethics is at the center of the research process with respect to seeking 
informed consent, causing no harm or detriment, and ensuring confidentiality for all those in-
volved (i.e., procedural ethics). Ernest claims that any research that does not conform to these 
most basic standards “is ethically flawed and its knowledge claims are suspect” (p. 13). Second, 
mathematics education researchers are participating “in the great, age-old human conversation 
that sustains and extends our common knowledge and cultural heritage,” as such “we and others 
benefit and grow” (p. 13.) Third, the species of human beings depends on its survival by sharing 
in ethical social and life behaviors with fellow humans. Fourth, drawing on Levinas and his eth-
ics as first philosophy, Ernest states— 
 
we owe a debt to the other that precedes and goes beyond reasons, decisions, and our 
thought processes, and precedes and exceeds any attempt to understand the other. Our 
infinite responsibility to the other person is, of course, ethical: “Ethics precedes ontolo-
gy […] ethics primarily signifies obligation toward the other, that it leads to the Law 
and to gratuitous service, which is not a principle of technique” (Levinas, 1987, p. 183). 
(p. 13) 
 
In the end, Ernest (2012) contends that positioning ethics as the first philosophy for mathe-
matics education research enables the larger research community “to rethink and re-evaluate 
some of the taken-for-granted commonplaces of our practices” (p. 14). Such re-thinking and -
evaluating opens up different possibilities for theorizing and researching mathematics teaching 
and learning. (Also see Ernest [2019] for or an “ethical audit” of mathematics and mathematics 
education.) 
How ethics is taken up across the paradigm spectrum is not so much about difference as it is 
about degree. Each of the paradigms—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct—
acknowledge at varying levels the importance of ethics throughout the research process. (Ad-
dressing and monitoring ethical concerns, however, have not always been practiced: e.g., the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study.) The difference is the degree to which the researcher’s focus is on pro-
cedural ethics, ethics in practice, or somewhere in between (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Or, in 
the case of mathematics education research, points one and two (i.e., procedural ethics) or points 
three and four (i.e., ethics in practice) (Ernest, 2012). 
The positivists of the predict paradigm rely heavily on the check boxes of the Institutional 
Review Boards; that which is ethical is knowable, discernable, and demonstrable. Objective ethi-
cal procedures drive the research process; these procedures exist independent of both the re-
searcher and the researched. In the understand paradigm, ethics is a both–and concern for the in-
terpretivists and constructivists. In that, both procedural ethics and ethics in practice are taken up 
(Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Reflexivity here becomes key as questions about researcher and 
participant positionality and how the process of conducting research affects both the study and 
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the human relationships are continuously engaged (Glesne, 1999). Reflexivity is key for the crit-
ical theorists of the emancipate paradigm as well. But here reflexivity is intertwined with and in 
critical socio-historical, -cultural, and -political interrogations of the so-named ethical procedures 
and practices (cf. Cannella & Lincoln, 2011). Conceptualizations of “good” research are expand-
ed to include human well-being (Hostetler, 2005) and public interest (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 
2006). Ethics in the deconstruct paradigm is interrogated further as even the possibility of ethics 
is considered. In other words, ethics, similar to existence, is always already contingent, multiple, 
fragmented, and becoming. Here, the governmentality (i.e., the way in which the state exercises 
control of its populace) of ethics becomes a grave concern as the ideal of a universal moral code 
of ethics is catastrophic (Foucault, 1978/2003a, 1984/1996). 
 
3.4 Summary of Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics 
  
Although dangerous, Table 2 provides a summary of the three philosophical considerations—
ontology, epistemology, and ethics—across the paradigms of inquiry spectrum—predict, under-
stand, emancipate, and deconstruct. It is dangerous because reducing a few thousand words down 
to a few dozen always erases the nuances of that which has been discussed. Nonetheless, similar 
to Table 1, Table 2 is provided here to offer a sharp visual summative account of the discussion. 
  
Table 2 
Philosophical Considerations across the Spectrum of Paradigms of Inquiry 
 
Considerations/ 
Paradigm Predict Understand Emancipate Deconstruct 
Ontology –  
study of existence 
Objective Realism: 
existence  
independent of 
knower 
Subjective  
Relativism:  
existence  
dependent on  
uncritical  
interpretations and 
constructions of 
knower 
Historical Realism: 
existence through 
socio-historical,         
-cultural, and              
-political  
discourses of pow-
er 
Anti-Universal  
Realism: existence 
always already 
contingent,  
multiple,  
fragmented, and 
becoming 
Epistemology –  
study of 
knowledge 
Objectivism: 
knowledge  
independent  
Subjectivism: 
knowledge in and 
through  
interactions:  
interpreted and 
constructed 
Critical  
Subjectivism: 
knowledge in and 
through discourses 
of domination and 
oppression 
Discursive  
Formation: 
knowledge in and 
through discursive 
events  
Ethics –  
principles of  
morality 
Objective  
procedural ethics 
Procedural ethics 
and reflexive ethics 
in practice 
Critical  
integrations of  
procedural ethics 
and reflexive ethics 
in practice 
Ethics always  
already contingent, 
multiple,  
fragmented, and 
becoming;  
anti-universal mor-
al code of  
ethics  
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4.  Where and How to Begin? Interrogate One’s Own Worldview 
 
It is important to acknowledge that ontology, epistemology, and ethics are not the only philo-
sophical considerations that are explicitly or implicitly engaged during the research process. 
Higginson (1980) also pointed to considerations about beauty (i.e., aesthetics), purpose (i.e., tel-
eology), and value (i.e., axiology). In more general terms, how a researcher understands the pos-
sibilities or impossibilities of issues such as “truth,” “certainty,” and “logical consistency” is de-
pendent on how she or he (or they) positions herself or himself (or themself) across the paradigm 
spectrum. Such decisions are not only about theoretical frameworks and methodological ap-
proaches but also, and more germane, about worldviews: a particular standpoint or philosophy 
for living in and making sense of the world. 
Lester and Wiliam (2000) claim that the relationship between knowledge claims and evi-
dence regarding what is researched, how research is conducted, and how results are interpreted 
and represented is more than simply establishing logical consistency but rather is determined, in 
large part, by a set of beliefs, values, and perspectives operating in the worldview of the re-
searcher. Comparably, Lerman (2013) contends that the theoretical framework through which a 
researcher organizes her or his (or their) “research, reads the data, revisits theory and interprets 
the findings is critical, and without such work the values of the researcher are hidden but never 
absent, of course” (p. 629). Valero (2004) also points to researcher values: 
 
What we choose to research and the ways in which we carry out that research are con-
structions determined, among other factors, by who we are and how we choose to engage 
in academic inquiry… There are considerable ‘subjective’ and ‘ideological’ grounds—
rather than ‘objective’ reasons—to engage in particular ways of conceiving and conduct-
ing research in mathematics education. (p. 2) 
 
In the end, considerations of ontology, epistemology, ethics, values, subjective and ideologi-
cal grounds, and so on—that is, the researcher’s worldview—should precede not follow theoreti-
cal and methodological considerations. Explicitly and critically interrogating one’s worldview 
should be the starting point of any research project. In so doing, the frantic search that novice 
(and even seasoned) researchers experience in selecting theoretical frameworks and methodolog-
ical approaches more times than not becomes self-evident and trivial. 
It is also equally important to acknowledge that predict, understand, emancipate, and decon-
struct are not the only identified paradigms in the social sciences. One additional (there are oth-
ers) paradigm that has attracted attention in the past decade or so has had multiple labels: post-
humanism (Ulmer, 2017), post-qualitative (St. Pierre, 2019), new materialism (de Freitas & Sin-
clair, 2013), the ontological turn (Lather, 2016). The umbrella label often used is “post-post”; 
key to this paradigm is a rethinking of humanist ontology in post-qualitative social science. 
These new new ways of thinking and being bring the entire project of social science into ques-
tion— 
 
If we cease to privilege knowing over being; if we refuse positivist and phenomenological 
assumptions about the nature of lived experience and the world; if we give up representation-
al and binary logics; if we see language, the human, and the material not as separate entities 
mixed together but as completely imbricated “on the surface”—if we do all that and the 
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“more” it will open up—will qualitative [or quantitative] inquiry as we know it be possible? 
Perhaps not. (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013, pp. 629–630) 
 
Given the limitation of space and my own lack of familiarity with this emerging paradigm, it 
was not explored here. Nevertheless, as our understandings of the world and universe continue to 
expand, I am confident that there will continue to be new new ways of living in and making 
sense of the world and universe; therefore, there will be new new ways of researching the world 
and universe around us. But no matter what new new ways of thinking and being become possi-
ble, philosophical considerations will always already be entangled with and in mathematics edu-
cation research. 
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